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THE CURING LAW:
ON THE EVOLUTION OF BABY-MAKING MARKETS
Noa Ben-Asher*
ABSTRACT
The article offers a new paradigm to examine the legal regulation
of reproductive technologies. The main argument is that a cure
paradigm has shaped historical and current legal baby-making markets.
Namely, reproductive technologies that have historically been
understood as a cure for infertility (such as sperm donations and egg
donations) have developed into market commodities, while others (such
as full surrogacy) which have not been understood as a cure, have not.
The article examines and critiques the cure paradigm. Specifically, the
article challenges one current manifestation of the cure paradigm: the
legal distinction between 'full surrogacy" (where a surrogate is
impregnated using her own ova) and "gestational surrogacy" (where
an embryo is created in vitro and then transferred into the surrogate's
uterus). Gestational surrogacy has been established by many state
courts and legislatures as a legitimate means of curing female
infertility, while full surrogacy has generally been either prohibited or
deemed unenforceable. This distinction is problematized in this article
not only because it is based on contestable values, but also because it
has produced serious market failures that have effectively excluded
many potential participants from entering baby-making markets. Thus,
the article argues that it is time to reevaluate the cure paradigm.
* Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School; LL.B., 1999, Bar-Ilan University School of
Law; LL.M., 2001, NYU School of Law; JSD, 2006, NYU School of Law. I am indebted to Ittai
Bar-Siman-Tov, Samuel Bray, Anita Chan, Mathilde Cohen, Sherry Colb, Mary Coombs, Marc
DeGirolami, Mike Dorf, Ariela Dubler, Elizabeth Emens, Katherine Franke, Suzanne Goldberg,
Janet Halley, Philip Hamburger, Joseph Landau, Tanusri Prasanna, Jessica Roberts, Bertrall Ross,
Carol Sanger, Elizabeth Scott, Mo Siedor, Alex Stein, James Stewart, Bela August Walker, and
Wade Wright for helpful feedback and discussions.
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INTRODUCTION
Attitudes of lawmakers toward some reproductive technologies
have evolved over the latter half of the twentieth century from
antagonism to approval. What happened in those moments of
transition? Why have some reproductive technologies been granted
legal recognition while others have not? This Article argues that among
other possible explanations, a social, medical and legal understanding of
certain reproductive technologies as medical cures for infertility has
played a determinative role in those moments of transition. In
particular, sperm donation was legalized by the late 1960s as a cure for
male infertility, and egg donation and gestational surrogacy were
1886 [Vol. 30:5
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2009] THE CURING LAW 1887
legalized beginning in the early 1990s as cures for female infertility.'
Following those moments of legal recognition, baby-making markets
developed. 2 The Article explores the evolution of a "curing law" in the
realm of baby-making markets.3
Three baby-making markets have emerged: (1) a sperm market; (2)
an egg market; and (3) a "gestational surrogacy" market. In "gestational
surrogacy" an embryo is created in vitro, using the ova of another
woman, whereas in "full surrogacy" the surrogate is impregnated using
her own ova. 4 In contrast with the three technologies that have so far
been legally recognized, full surrogacy has not been granted legal
recognition primarily because it has been understood as "baby-selling."
5
The surrogate's role in full surrogacy has been viewed as replacement
of maternal labor and not as a cure for female infertility.
Through the lens of the cure paradigm, the Article underscores two
paradoxical characteristics of current baby-making markets. First,
gestational surrogacy has been legally recognized as a legitimate form
of curing female infertility, 6 whereas full surrogacy has not.7 Second,
there is a sex-based differentiation in the regulation of reproductive
technologies: while the legal recognition of sperm donation has
involved a full detachment of the paternal body from the process of
reproduction through replacement of paternal sperm with donor sperm,
I The article uses two different methodologies to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the "cure
paradigm." First, it points to actual language and rhetoric of case-law, statutory law, and medical
literature in the moments of legalization. Second, it offers the cure paradigm as an overarching
logical explanation in instances where lawmakers do not explicitly draw on its logic. Namely,
while in some cases the article points to explicit manifestations of the cure paradigm, in other
instances, the article offers the cure paradigm as a possible explanation among others for
understanding certain developments in baby-making markets.
2 For general commodification debates see, for example, RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES (1996); Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL &
PUB. AFF. 71 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2334 (1995) (concluding that the analogy to baby-selling
"only strengthens the conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal"); Richard A. Posner,
The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (1989) (arguing in favor of surrogacy contract enforcement); Elisabeth
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978) (urging the enforcement of baby-selling agreements).
3 I take the term "baby-making" from Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In
the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007).
4 To this day, most cases and literature refer to what I call "full surrogacy" as "traditional
surrogacy." Ironically, as this article demonstrates, it is "traditional" surrogacy that has been
since the 1980s the most controversial reproductive technology. Therefore the article uses the
term "full surrogacy," which better captures the nature of this arrangement.
5 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234, 109 N.J. 396, 411 (1988) (holding that a full
surrogacy agreement is unenforceable because it conflicts with public policy and statutory law of
New Jersey).
6 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993) (enforcing a gestational
surrogacy agreement against gestational surrogate).
7 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234.
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the parallel full detachment of the maternal body from the process of
reproduction through the use of a full surrogate has not been legally
recognized.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the emergence
of the medicalized cure paradigm in the 1950s and its consequent
impact on the regulation of sperm donation, egg donation, and
gestational surrogacy. This Part traces two legal-historical phases. In
the first phase of the cure paradigm, which occurred in the 1950s and
1960s, sperm donation was gradually understood by medical experts
and lawmakers as a cure for male infertility. In the second phase of the
cure paradigm, beginning in the early 1990s, two components of in vitro
fertilization (IVF) were recognized by lawmakers as cures for female
infertility: egg donation and gestational surrogacy. Consequently, those
three reproductive technologies (egg donation, sperm donation and
gestational surrogacy) make up current baby-making markets.
Part II argues that full surrogacy, unlike egg donation and
gestational surrogacy, has been legally understood as baby-selling and
not as a cure for female infertility. This Part examines the ethical and
moral objections to full surrogacy raised by lawmakers, feminists and
medical experts in the 1980s, which provided the theoretical basis for
the development of the baby-selling paradigm.
Part III critiques the cure paradigm drawing on two different
theoretical perspectives. Section A examines the cure paradigm from a
feminist/queer perspective, arguing that the cure paradigm has in fact
masked cultural assumptions about sex, gender and reproduction.
Section B examines current baby-making markets from an economic
perspective, arguing that the cure paradigm has resulted in baby-making
markets that exclude lower-income individuals and couples who cannot
afford in vitro fertilization and embryo implantation. In conclusion,
Section C argues that the distinction between gestational and full
surrogacy should be eliminated and that full surrogacy should be legally
recognized by lawmakers.
I. THE MEDICALIZED CURE PARADIGM
The cure paradigm appeared in two phases in the evolution of
baby-making markets in the U.S. In the first phase (1950s-1960s),
sperm donation was gradually understood by medical experts and
lawmakers as a cure for male infertility, and consequently legalized. In
the second phase (early 1990s and on), two components of IVF were
legalized as a cure for female infertility: egg donation and gestational
surrogacy. The following genealogies reveal that in both phases of the
cure paradigm, a medicalized understanding of a specific reproductive
1888 [Vol. 30:5
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THE CURING LAW
technology as a cure for infertility replaced a former understanding of
the technology as immoral or unethical.
A. First Phase: The Legalization of Sperm Donation
The cure paradigm emerged around the mid-twentieth century as a
new way of understanding donor sperm insemination. The shift in the
legal classification of donor insemination involved a conceptual
transition from a traditional view of donor insemination as an adulterous
act, to a modern-scientific view of donor insemination as a medical cure
for male infertility. This transition enabled the flourishing of the market
for sperm that we have today.
1. The Previous Legal Classification of Sperm Donation as Adultery
Donor sperm insemination was historically treated as an act of
adultery on the part of a wife who had been inseminated by sperm other
than that of her husband. As articulated in Gursky v. Gursky,
"heterologous artificial insemination by a third party donor, with or
without the consent of the husband, constitutes adultery on the part of
the mother, and ... a child so conceived is not a child born in wedlock
and is, therefore, illegitimate." 8  One of the main consequences of
classifying donor insemination as adultery was illegitimacy of the child
born of donor insemination. Thus, in Gursky, upon separation of
husband and wife, the New York court ruled that there was no issue of
the marriage because a child conceived through donor insemination was
not the husband's biological child.9 Likewise, in Abajian v. Dennett, a
New York court ruled that an ex-wife wishing to deny her ex-husband
visitation or custody was estopped from asserting that her pregnancy
was a result of donor insemination because "to stigmatize them as
children of an unknown father by means of artificial insemination of the
mother is no more ... than an attempt to make these innocents out as
children of bastardy. And where a parent attempts such means, the law
will still the lips of such a parent." 10 The court "stilled the lips" of a
8 Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (citation omitted).
9 The court emphasized the limited scope of Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
1948), which held that children born of donor insemination are legitimate. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d
at 410-11 ("The view expressed by the court in that case, that such child was not an illegitimate
child, is supported by no legal precedent.").
10 People ex rel. Abajian v. Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 183 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Some courts,
however, were less clear regarding the adulterous nature of the procedure. For example, in the
first (unreported) case in the United States involving artificial insemination, Hoch v. Hoch, the
court opined that donor insemination is insufficient evidence for adultery. See Charles E. Rice,
2009] 1889
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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
mother who wished to say the truth about the conception of her children
because this truth would change the status of her children from
"innocents" whose father had been the mother's husband, to "children
of bastardy" whose father had been the sperm donor.
This judicial language of stigma and bastardy reflects a widespread
moral condemnation of donor insemination that was shared by various
legal commentators, courts, medical experts, and religious authorities in
the U.S., Britain and Canada in the mid-1900s. The American public
was polled in the 1950s by social scientists who reported negative social
attitudes toward donor insemination. It was commonly thought that
"[c]ouples who are involuntarily sterile may better satisfy their parental
urge by adopting a child."' 2 As for others, marriage was "their solution
rather than artificial insemination."13 In Britain, a committee on donor
insemination concluded that although the practice "is to be strongly
discouraged, it should not be declared criminal or be regulated by law"
because "it falls within the category of actions known to students of
jurisprudence as 'liberties' which while not prohibited by law will
receive no kind of support or encouragement from the law." 14
In essence, the moral unease with donor insemination had to do
with the idea of it being a crime against the husband and the family that
"should be condemned because it is contrary to the accepted standards
of adultery and legitimacy."' 5  Donor insemination was considered a
moral threat to the husband and the family for three interrelated reasons.
First, it was believed that the introduction of foreign sperm would
weaken the existing social order that is "built on the nucleus of the
family growing from the marriage of one man and one woman for life to
the exclusion of all others."16 Second, donor insemination was seen as a
A.ID.-An Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 514 (1959); see also Strnad, 78
N.Y.S.2d at 392 ("Indeed, logically and realistically, the situation is no different than that
pertaining in the case of a child born out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate upon the
marriage of the interested parties.").
11 See, e.g., Glenn M. Vernon & Jack A. Boadway, Attitudes Toward Artificial Insemination
and Some Variables Associated Therewith, 21 MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 43 (1959) (finding
relatively little acceptance of donor insemination among college students, but that males
evidenced greater acceptance than did the females); Joseph H. Greenberg, Social Variables in
Acceptance or Rejection ofArtificial Insemination, 16 AM. SOC. REV. 86 (1951) (finding that the
identity of the donor appears to determine social attitudes concerning artificial insemination-
while less than 10% rejected artificial insemination using the sperm of the husband, close to 50%
rejected donor insemination).
12 J.G.P., Artificial Insemination Versus Adoption, 34 VA. L. REV. 822, 829 (1948).
13 Id. at 828.
14 See Robert S.W. Pollard, Report on the Departmental Committee on Human Artificial
Insemination, 24 MOD. L. REV. 158, 162 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 J.G.P., supra note 12, at 824.
16 Id. The Catholic Church, for example, ruled out the legitimacy of donor insemination in
1949, 1951, and 1956, arguing that it reduces marriage and the conjugal act to a mere organic
function, thus turning the family into nothing more than a "biological laboratory." See Pius XII,
Allocution: Artificial Insemination (Sept. 29, 1949), in 3 THE CANON LAW DIGEST: OFFICIALLY
1890 [Vol. 30:5
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direct threat to the husband's bloodline. 17 Third, it was thought that the
"increasing production of children by means of artificial insemination
from unknown donors enhances the possibilities of incestuous
marriages and incestuous relationships."' 8 In The Enforcement of
Morality, H.L.A. Hart mentions that "speakers in the House of Lords
urged that the practice should be prohibited by criminal law and Lord
Denning indeed claimed that if the facts [regarding wife donor
insemination] were concealed from the husband the practice was
already illegal as a form of criminal conspiracy."' 9
2. The Shift to the De-Sexualized Cure Paradigm
The proposal to criminalize donor insemination in Britain was
rejected, leading H.L.A. Hart to the conclusion that "today the
conversion of deviation from accepted morality into criminal offences is
not as easy as it once was."'20 From today's perspective we can see that
it is not only that around the mid-twentieth century the "deviation" of
sperm donation was not criminalized-it was converted into a new legal
good. How did this flip happen?
By the 1950s, many medical fertility experts and physicians
supported the proposition that donor insemination should be legitimized
because it held out the possibility of curing infertility in the male.21
PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AFFECTING THE CODE OF CANON LAW 1942-53, at 432-33 (T. Lincoln
Bouscaren ed., 1953); Pius XII, Allocution: Artificial Insemination Condemned (Oct. 29, 1951),
in 3 THE CANON LAW DIGEST: OFFICIALLY PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AFFECTING THE CODE OF
CANON LAW 1942-53, at 434 (T. Lincoln Bouscaren ed., 1953).
17 See J.G.P., supra note 12, at 825 (describing a Canadian case where the court stated in
dicta that "the essence of the [donor insemination] offense was not in the immoral act of sexual
intercourse, but in 'the voluntary surrender by the guilty person of the reproductive powers or
faculties to one other than the husband or wife') (quoting Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15
(1921)); see also J.G.P., supra note 12, at 826 (explaining that the precise offense was
introducing into the family of the husband a false stream of blood). Notably, some legal
commentators at the time insisted that donor insemination was not adultery because there was no
act of sexual intercourse. See, e.g., Comment, Artificial Insemination: A Parvenu Intrudes on
Ancient Law, 58 YALE L. J. 457, 464 (1949) (noting that "the initial selection depends primarily
on whether the judge feels more moral indignation against the evils of sterility than against the
encroachment by science on the legal reserves of family life").
18 See, e.g., Morris Ploscowe, The Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems: A Legal View II,
31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1243 (1956) ("The incest taboo is one of the strongest in our society
.... ").
19 H.L.A. HART, The Enforcement of Morality, in THE MORALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW: TWO
LECTURES 31, 42 (1964) (discussing a recent divorce action where a judge ruled that artificial
insemination of a wife by donor sperm did not constitute adultery).
20 Id. at 42 (The Feversham Committee, appointed following this debate, rejected the
proposal to criminalize the practice.).
21 See Gaia Berstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at
Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1035, 1079 (2002) (demonstrating how historically the
medical profession mediated between the restraints imposed by legal uncertainty and the use of
2009] 1891
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This medical framework desexualized the previous understanding of
donor insemination. 22 This was manifested not only in the language but
also in the physical re-location of the donor insemination procedure. In
the 1930s, some medical practitioners, still operating under the
assumption that a woman must be sexually aroused to allow upward
movement of sperm, thought that intercourse must precede the
procedure, and thus performed the process in the couple's bedroom. 23
In contrast, by the 1950s, medical literature detached the link between
the appropriate timing for insemination and the woman's orgasm.24 It
was no longer thought that a woman could only become pregnant
following her sexual arousal. The physician no longer had to perform
the procedure in the bedroom, and it was moved to the physician's
office.
25
But the legal classification of donor insemination as adultery posed
a very concrete problem for courts: child support. If the husband is a
legal stranger to the child, and the donor is in many cases anonymous,
who is responsible for supporting the child? Although it still classified
donor insemination as adultery, the Gursky court identified the problem
of child support, and to overcome it, distinguished support from
legitimacy, holding that "while the court is constrained to hold that the
child of the defendant wife is not the legitimate issue of the plaintiff
husband, it does not follow that the husband is thereby free of obligation
to furnish support for the child. '26 Thus, "in the instant case ... the
husband is liable for the support of the child here involved, whether on
the basis of an implied contract to support or by reason of application of
the doctrine of equitable estoppel. '2 7
A conceptual and terminological shift in the assessment of donor
insemination is evident in the transition from Abajian (1958) to Gursky
(1963). While in both cases donor insemination was still understood as
adultery, language of sexual virtue and traditional morality in Abajian
shifts to language of social duty and responsibility for child support in
Gursky. While in Abajian, the court focused on stigma, shame,
innocence and bastardy, the court in Gursky based its decision on the
husband's social obligation of child support. This shift is also
embodied in the legal party who is the target of estoppel. While
estoppel in Abajian was used to silence the wife (from relying on the
adulterous nature of donor insemination to deny her ex-husband's
custody or visitation), in Gursky it was utilized to silence the husband
the technology).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1064.
24 Id. at 1075 (citation omitted).
25 Id. at 1075.
26 Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
27 Id. at412.
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(from relying on the adulterous nature of donor insemination to deny his
own obligation to support the child).
This conceptual transition from sexual virtue and stigma to cure
and social responsibility was finalized in 1968 by the Supreme Court of
California in People v. Sorensen.28 The Sorensen court dismissed the
adultery paradigm as "patently absurd." Interestingly, in this case a new
potential criminal identity emerged: that of a husband who fails to
support his child born of donor insemination. The Sorensen court had
to determine whether "the husband of a woman, who with his consent
was artificially inseminated with semen of a third-party donor, [is]
guilty of the crime of failing to support a child who is the product of
such insemination, in violation of section 270 of the [California] Penal
Code. 29 The court concluded that the husband was indeed guilty.30
The Sorensen court abandoned the adultery framework altogether:
Adultery is defined as "the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married
person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife." It
has been suggested that the doctor and wife commit adultery by the
process of artificial insemination. Since the doctor may be a woman,
or the husband himself may administer the insemination by a
syringe, this is patently absurd; to consider it an act of adultery with
the donor, who at the time of insemination may be a thousand miles
away or may even be dead, is equally absurd. 31
Given the definition of adultery as voluntary sex, various
adulterous scenes were offered and dismissed by the court. First, the
court raised the scene of insemination of the wife by the husband
himself using a syringe. The notion of absurdity here comes from the
latter part of the adultery definition-"with a person other than the
offender's husband or wife." Because the husband cannot at the same
time act as himself and as a person other than himself, this adulterous
scene makes no sense. Second, the court sketches an adulterous sex
scene of a female doctor with a female patient, which it then dismisses.
It appears that (in 1968) the very idea of woman to woman sex seemed
ridiculous to the court. A third adulterous scene takes place between the
wife and the donor who may be a thousand miles away or even dead.
The court moved to a new understanding of the procedure. It is a
contract to cure infertility that carries with it a heavy social
responsibility. When a man, "because of his inability to procreate,"
consents to his wife's artificial insemination, he "knows that such
behavior carries with it the legal responsibilities of fatherhood and
28 People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280 (1968).
29 Id. at 283.
30 Id. at 283-84 ("The law is that defendant is the lawful father of the child born to his wife,
which child was conceived by artificial insemination to which he consented, and his conduct
carries with it an obligation of support with the meaning of section 270 of the Penal Code.").
31 Id. at 289 (internal citations omitted).
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criminal responsibility for nonsupport. '32  No longer perceived as
sexual adultery, donor insemination is now the purchase of a donor's
sperm in order to cure male infertility. Or as put by the court, a man
who "unable to accomplish his objective of creating a child by using his
own semen, purchases semen from a donor and uses it to inseminate his
wife to achieve his purpose. 33
The donor was no longer perceived as selling a child to the couple.
He was now "some other male" whose sperm is "utilized" for the
conception of the wife. 34 The Sorensen court concluded that "within the
meaning of section 270 of the Penal Code, defendant is the lawful father
of the child conceived through heterologous artificial insemination and
born during his marriage to the child's mother. ' 35 A new potential
criminal liability emerged: the non-paying husband of a woman
inseminated via donor insemination.
Focusing on the "best interest" of the child, the court emphasized
that "no valid public purpose is served by stigmatizing an artificially
conceived child as illegitimate," 36 and that "the intent of the Legislature
obviously was to include every child, legitimate or illegitimate, born or
unborn, and enforce the obligation of support against the person who
could be determined to be the lawful parent. '37 The Sorensen court
offered the following theory of punishment:
Rather than punishment of the neglectful parent, the principal
statutory objectives are to secure support of the child and to protect
the public from the burden of supporting a child who has a parent
able to support him. Section 270d of the Penal Code provides that if
a fine is imposed on a convicted defendant, the court shall direct its
payment in whole or in part to the wife of the defendant or guardian
of the child, except that if the child is receiving public assistance the
fine imposed or funds collected from the defendant shall be paid to
the county department .... 38
It seems important for the court here to stress that the defendant
husband is not being punished for a crime. Instead, a social obligation
is enforced upon him. Shame, stigma, bastardy and "stilled lips" no
32 Id. at 285.
33 Id. at 286.
34 Id. at 289 ("Nor are we persuaded that the concept of legitimacy demands that the child be
the actual offspring of the husband of the mother and if semen of some other male is utilized the
resulting child is illegitimate.").
35 Id. Notably, the problem that the New York Court in Gursky encountered when applying
the adultery framework could not be solved here through the doctrines of implied contract and
equitable estoppel. Sorensen was a criminal case, not a divorce action, and the husband had to be
declared the legal father, convicted and punished for failing to support his child or acquitted as a
legal stranger to the child. The court chose the former and no longer viewed itself as
"constrained" like the Gursky court by the adultery framework.
36 Id. at 288.
37 Id. at 284-85.
38 Id. at 287.
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longer take center stage. There is now an inherent social obligation
from the father toward the child, the mother and society at large which
the statute seeks to "insure and facilitate ... where necessary. '39
Therefore, the fine paid by the convicted father is directed to the wife or
the legal guardian.
The Sorensen understanding of donor insemination as a cure for
infertility was adopted by later cases across the nation, and by the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), as first promulgated in 1973, which
provided that with the husband's consent, donor insemination is legal,
and that the donor shall not be perceived as the legal father.40 In 1968,
Georgia was the first state to legitimize donor insemination by a statute
providing a conclusive presumption of legitimacy when a child is born
through donor insemination performed with the written consent of both
husband and wife, and permitting only licensed physicians to perform
the procedure. 41 In the following decade, many states followed with
similar statutes.42
The shift in the legal classification of sperm donations from
adultery to a cure also involved a shift in authority. Physicians were
granted the absolute authority to choose donor sperm, many times
turning to doctors or medical students for sperm. Some were in fact
alarmed that physicians were using medical technology to reproduce
their own kind.43  This "self breeding" raised the concern that
physicians were engaged in eutelegenesis, an envisioned system of
donor insemination that would use the sperm of genetically superior
males, so that "the services of a prize male can be vastly multiplied and
carried over wide areas. '44
These social and legal debates about sperm donation at the time
also involved broader concerns about social engineering and
"improving" of the human species. The promise of eugenics appealed
39 Id.
40 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (repealed 2000); 9B U.L.A. 407 (2001).
41 GA. CODEANN. § 19-7-21 (2008).
42 By the end of the 1970s at least fifteen states had statutes regulating donor insemination.
All provided that the resulting child was the natural child of the recipient's husband if the
husband consented to the procedure. Five states required that the consent be filed with a state
agency and six states, either directly or by implication, limited the practice of donor insemination
to physicians. By 198 1, this number had grown to twenty-three states, and by 1985 twenty-eight
states had donor insemination statutes. Nine of the statutes were modeled after the UPA. See
Bernstein, supra note 21, at 1090-91.
43 See George J. Annas, Artificial Insemination: Beyond the Best Interests of the Donor, 9
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 14 (1979) ("There can be little debate that physicians in all of these
situations are making eugenic decisions-selecting what they consider "superior" genes for AID
[donor insemination]. In general they have chosen to reproduce themselves (or those in their
profession), and this is what sociobiologists would probably have predicted. While this should
not be surprising, it should be a cause for concern.").
44 Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1850,
1855 (1981) (citing A. SCHEINFELD, YOUR HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT 662 (1965)).
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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
to some supporters of sperm donation. In medical and legal literature of
the 1950s through the 1970s, donor insemination was explicitly
celebrated as offering mankind a perfect eugenic opportunity. 45 Some
believed that "the highly endowed have a genetic duty to bear large
families in order to perpetuate a 'better man.' '46 The legitimization of
artificial insemination was seen as a first and necessary step towards
"controlled breeding. '47  As noted by one legal commentator,
"[m]edicine has included in its ground rules provisions capable of
producing eugenically superior children in better homes more than is
true in most instances where the child is biologically related to its
mother's spouse. '48  Indeed, according to this legal commentator,
scientists have so far been successful in this task, since there were no
reported instances of "biologically inferior" children born via the
technology. 49
This overall transition in legal, medical and societal values is
summarized in the following chart.
45 Id. at 1850 (1981) (claiming that in the United States as of 1980, "[e]ugenics is by no
means dead"); George P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the
Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 147 n. 107 (1968) (defining eugenics as "a science that deals with the
improvement of hereditary qualities in a series of generations of a race or a breed especially by
social control of human mating and reproduction-race improvement"); James F. Crow,
Mechanisms and Trends in Human Evolution, 90 DAEDALUS 416, 429 (1961); Roderic Gorney,
The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 UCLA L. REV. 273, 280 (1968); Hermann J. Muller,
Should We Weaken or Strengthen Our Genetic Heritage?, 90 DAEDALUS 432, 439-42 (1961);
William T. Vukowich, Dawning of a Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of
Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 189, 222-25.
46 Smith, supra note 45, at 147 (citing Muller, Human Evolution by Voluntary Choice of
Germ Plasm, 134 SCIENCE 643 (1961)).
47 Id. at 149-50 ("Man is the last to breed selectively; rather than allow variant
experimentation in this sensitive realm, he must devise appropriate procedures by which to isolate
and perpetuate the most desirable human characteristics.").
48 Comment, supra note 17, at 466 & n.38 ("A variety of reports indicate the generally
superior home conditions which medical screening provides children born via artificial
insemination.").
49 Id. at 466 n.38.
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MID-CENTURY DONOR INSEMINATION DEBATES
Attitude Justifications Consequent Consequent
Toward Status of Status of
Donor Donor Sperm
Insemination Donation
Before Rejection Weakening of Parent Adultery
1950s nuclear family;
adulterous
termination of
paternal
bloodline;
incest
After Endorsement Cure; child Legal Cure for
1950s support; happy Stranger Infertility
marriages;
Eugenics
3. The Development of a Sperm Market
The legal adoption of the cure paradigm has resulted in an open
and free market for sperm. The four decades since the Sorensen
decision have seen a rapid development of a market for sperm. Martha
Ertman has observed that today the donor insemination market is a
"literal market and a relatively free, open market," in which "[b]anks
and recipients demand sperm, and donors and banks supply it," and that
"lack of regulation and a relatively low price for the gametes mean that
it is both an open market in which a large number of people can
participate, and a free market that flourishes because of its comparative
freedom from regulation. '50
Indeed, commercial sperm banks have appeared in the fertility
landscape since the 1970s, when the first for-profit bank opened its
doors in Minnesota.5' By 1980, seventeen sperm banks across the
nation were offering more than one hundred thousand sperm samples
for sale. 52 Those banks supplied sperm at roughly sixty-six dollars per
50 Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved
Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (2003) (questioning the assumption that
privatization only benefits powerful players at the expense of everyone else, and proposing a new
and improved theory of commodification that accounts for multiple valances of commodification
in any particular context).
51 DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS 35 (2006).
52 Id. at 36 & n.10 (citing Anne Taylor Fleming, New Frontiers in Conception, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 20, 1980, at 14).
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specimen, resulting in the birth of twenty thousand babies. 53 Donors
were typically young professionals chosen by the banks based on their
physical and genetic characteristics. In 1980, the sperm bank
"Repository for Germinal Choice" was set up to collect sperm from
Nobel Prize winners and Olympic athletes. 54 By 1999, there were more
than one hundred sperm banks in the United States, 55 and in 2000, the
Wall Street Journal estimated the global market for sperm exports to be
worth anywhere between fifty and one hundred million dollars per
year.56 Today, sperm customers in the United States want to know as
much as possible about the donors,57 and firms usually provide
customers with information such as hobbies, family history, favorite
foods, and handwriting samples. 58
In sum, in the transition of the legal status of donor insemination
from adultery to legitimate cure, four significant things happened. First,
the moral and legal condemnation of donor insemination was replaced
by its legitimization as a "cure for infertility." By the late 1960s,
medical and social authorities offered an emergency supply of meaning
that shaped a new legal understanding of donor insemination as
legitimate curing treatment for infertility. In fact, the classification of
sperm donation as a cure for infertility is apparent in medical literature
to this day. A recent American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) publication indicates that "[c]urrently, therapeutic donor
insemination ... is appropriate when the male partner has severe
abnormalities in the semen parameters. '59 With the idea of a cure,
donor insemination became legitimate and legal-it had legs. Second,
social responsibility of fathers became a leading justification in the
legalization of donor insemination. In Sorensen, the infertile man was
not only understood to be cured by the sperm transaction, he was also
held socially responsible for the child to whose birth he consented. In
this new governance of the family, family law and criminal law jointly
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, supra note 44, at 1850
(citing A Bank for Nobel Sperm, 207 SCIENCE 1326 (1980); Breeding for IQ's-A Plan Under
Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1980, at 49; Superkids? A Sperm Bank for Nobelists,
TIME, Mar. 10, 1980, at 49).
55 SPAR, supra note 51, at 37-38 (noting that today the business of sperm banking, "tend[s] to
be dominated by a small number of relatively large firms, each armed with a sizable donor base,
highly specific technical expertise, and an inherent interest in expansion").
56 Id. at 38 (citing Pascal Zachary, Family Planning: Welcome to the Global Sperm Trade,
WALL STREET J., Jan. 6, 2000, at B1).
57 Id. at 37. In addition, federal regulation requires that all sperm must be kept in storage for
a period of at least six months, during which the donor is tested for HIV, hepatitis and other
sexually transmitted diseases. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.85 (2008).
58 SPAR, supra note 51, at 39.
59 AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 9
(2006), available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/thirdparty.pdf [hereinafter
ASRM Guide for Patients].
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"cure" the family from male infertility and from male irresponsibility.
The law no longer stood to protect the husband from the "adulterous"
act of donor insemination; instead the husband turned into a debtor of
the child, the mother and the state. 60 Third, sperm was no longer
understood as a necessary signifier of paternity. As the status of
fatherhood was gradually becoming an issue of consent and social
responsibility, the paternal body was detached from the material process
of reproduction. 61  Fourth-and this is where we stand today-a free
market for sperm emerged.
B. Second Phase: The Legalization of Egg Donation and Gestational
Surrogacy
The technology of IVF enabled the splitting of female contribution
to the reproductive process into two parts: genetics and gestation.
Unlike full surrogacy (discussed at length in Part II), over the past two
decades egg donation and gestational surrogacy have generally been
understood by medical experts and lawmakers as legitimate and
desirable cures for female infertility.
60 The decline in the legal status of the patriarch is discussed in Duncan Kennedy's recent
mapping of two overlapping periods of legal institutional and conceptual change in the West:
Classical Legal Thought (CLT) between 1850 and 1914, and Socially Oriented Legal Thought,
between 1900 and 1968. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought:
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). In the period of Classical Legal Thought,
according to Kennedy, the issue of the "household" was conceived through the distinction, within
private law, between the law of obligations and family law. In this "early modem" system of
family law, "the patriarch was legally obliged to support his wife and minor children, entitled to
their obedience, which he could enforce through moderate physical punishment, had arbitrary
power with respect to many aspects of their welfare and property, and was protected against
sexual and economic interference by third parties." Id. at 32. In what Kennedy calls the "second
globalization of legal thought" (1900-1968), individualism and will theory came under critique,
giving rise to the idea of "the social." The family became an institution whose function is crucial
for the social as a whole. Id. at 51. No longer a private matter under the control of the patriarch,
"[e]very aspect of family life had, given social interdependence, far-reaching consequences for all
other social functions." Id.
61 The Supreme Court's unwed father jurisprudence in the second half of the century also
echoes this transition in the status of the father. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (holding constitutional a statute preventing a biological father or child from challenging
presumptive fatherhood of mother's husband); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding
that despite his having neither notice nor hearing, an unwed biological father's rights to object to
termination of his parental rights through adoption of his child by the mother's new husband had
been sufficiently protected by New York law).
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1. Egg Markets
The first "test tube" baby was born in 1978 in England. By the
spring of 1983, about one hundred and fifty babies had been conceived
in vitro, but success rates for IVF were still slim. 62 Between the years
1995 and 1998, there was a thirty-seven percent increase in the number
of in vitro procedures performed in the U.S., from about 59,000 to about
81,000. The number of fertility clinics also grew from 281 to 360.63
IVF enabled the retrieval of eggs from donors and implantation in
intended mothers who could gestate a pregnancy but who could not
produce viable eggs. In medical expert literature and patient guidelines,
egg donation has been understood as a legitimate curing treatment for
infertility. For example, in August of 2000, the ethics committee of the
ASRM published its ethical approval of financial incentives for egg
donations, stressing that egg donations will "in turn, allow[] more
infertile persons to have children. ' 64  Egg donation, according to
ASRM, is desirable and should be compensable because it cures female
infertility and allows women who otherwise could not bear children to
do so.
The legal status of egg donation has generally been equated to that
of sperm donation. Some states have enacted egg donation statutes to
reflect this analogy. In Kentucky, for example, egg donation is named
as an exception to the statutory prohibition of full surrogacy
arrangements. 65 Likewise, a Colorado statute provides that "if, under
the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife consents to assisted reproduction with an egg donated
by another woman, to conceive a child for herself, not as a surrogate,
the wife is treated in law as if she were the natural mother of a child
thereby conceived. ' 66 In the past decade, Virginia, Texas, Florida, and
Oklahoma have enacted statutes similarly clarifying that egg donation is
a legitimate infertility treatment, and that an egg donor is not the parent
62 SPAR, supra note 51, at 28.
63 Id. at 29.
64 Ethics Comm., Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Financial Incentives in Recruitment of
Oocyte Donors, 74 FERTILITY & STERILITY 216, 218 (2000) ("First, providing financial
incentives increases the number of oocyte donors, which in turn allows more infertile persons to
have children. Second, the provision of financial or in-kind benefits does not necessarily
discourage altruistic motivations ... . Third, financial incentives may be defended on grounds
that they advance the ethical goal of fairness to donors. From this perspective, women who agree
to provide oocytes to others ought to be given the opportunity to benefit from their action.").
65 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (2008) ("This section shall not be construed to prohibit
in vitro fertilization. For purposes of this section, 'in vitro fertilization' means the process by
which an egg is removed from a woman, and fertilized in a receptacle by the sperm of the
husband of the woman in whose womb the fertilized egg will thereafter be implanted.").
66 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106(1) (2008).
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of a child conceived through assisted conception. 6
A similar approach to egg donation has been expressed by courts in
parental disputes where, upon separation, fathers sought declarations of
sole paternity and full custody alleging that their wife, inseminated
through the process of egg donation, had no genetic relationship to the
child. Despite the lack of a genetic connection to the child in these
cases, courts have recognized the status of the gestational parent as the
natural and legal mother. In McDonald v. McDonald, for example, a
New York appellate court used the cure logic, stressing that "[b]ecause
the wife was unable to conceive naturally, she conceived through a
process known as 'in vitro' fertilization. '68 The court characterized the
case as a "true 'egg donation"' situation, in which "the wife, who is the
gestational mother, is the natural mother of the children." 69  The
Supreme Court of Tennessee faced a similar dispute regarding triplets
born of egg donation to an unmarried couple.70 Echoing the cure logic,
the court held that the birth-giver was the legal mother, because "[t]he
egg donor is a surrogate insofar as she provides eggs in place of and on
behalf of another woman who cannot produce viable eggs.' The egg
donor, in other words, cures the woman who cannot produce viable
eggs. 72
2. Gestational Surrogacy Markets
Gestational surrogacy is also regulated in a growing number of
jurisdictions as a recognized and legitimate form of curing female
67 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) ("A donor is not the parent of a child conceived through
assisted conception, unless the donor is the husband of the gestational mother."); id. § 20-156
("Donor means an individual, other than a surrogate, who contributes the sperm or egg used in
assisted conception."); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.702 (2008) ("A donor is not a parent of a
child conceived by means of assisted reproduction."); id. §160.102 ("'Donor' means an
individual who provides eggs or sperm to a licensed physician to be used for assisted
reproduction, regardless of whether the eggs or sperm are provided for consideration."); FLA.
STAT. § 742.14 (West 2008) ("The donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the
commissioning couple ... shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and obligations with
respect to the donation or the resulting children. Only reasonable compensation directly related to
the donation of eggs, sperm, and preembryos shall be permitted."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 §
554 (West 2008) ("Any child or children born as a result of a heterologous oocyte donation shall
be considered for all legal intents and purposes, the same as a naturally conceived legitimate child
of the husband and wife which consent to and receive an oocyte pursuant to the use of the
technique of heterologous oocyte donation.").
68 196 A.D.2d 7, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
69 Id. at 12.
70 In re CKG, 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005).
71 Id. at 720.
72 But see K.M. v. E.G, 117 P.3d 673, 37 Cal. 4th 130 (2005) (holding that an egg donor who
donated an egg to her same sex partner is the genetic mother of the child who thus has two legal
mothers because this was not a "true" egg donation situation).
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infertility. The (1) medical necessity and (2) genetic contribution of the
intended mother have repeatedly been underscored in the ongoing
process of state-by-state validation of gestational surrogacy agreements.
Accordingly, a distinction has emerged between "gestational carrier"
and "surrogate mother." The term "gestational carrier" has been
designated for a woman who carries the genetic child of "another,"
while the term "surrogate" or "surrogate mother" has been designated
for a woman who carries a child of "her own" with the intention of
giving "her" child up to another via adoption.
In Johnson v. Calvert, the Supreme Court of California set up the
prevalent evaluation of gestational surrogacy agreements in its reading
of the facts of the case:
Mark and Crispina Calvert are a married couple who desired to have
a child. Crispina was forced to undergo a hysterectomy in 1984.
Her ovaries remained capable of producing eggs, however, and the
couple eventually considered surrogacy. In 1989 Anna Johnson
heard about Crispina's plight from a coworker and offered to serve
as a surrogate for the Calverts. 73
This is the story of a married couple who (1) desires to have
children; (2) is unable to procreate "naturally" due to a medical
problem; and (3) is cured by medical science with the service of a
"gestational carrier." Based on this narrative of cure, the court held that
the infertile intended mother who provided the eggs is the legal mother
of this child.74  The court clarified that the gestational surrogacy
agreement does not constitute a pre-birth waiver of the surrogate's
parental rights because gestational surrogacy is not subject to the
adoption statutes. Accordingly, "payments to [the surrogate] under the
contract were meant to compensate her for her services in gestating the
fetus and undergoing the labor, rather than for giving up 'parental'
rights to the child. '75
In the ongoing process of legal recognition of gestational surrogacy
agreements that has followed Calvert, state courts, legislatures and
medical experts have emphasized the medical necessity of the intended
mother and the genetic contribution of one or both intended parents.
For example, in JR. v. Utah, a case involving the status of a gestational
73 Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 87 (1993) (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 93 ("[A]lthough [the UPA] recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as
means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one
woman, she who intended to procreate the child that is, she who intended to bring about the
birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under California
law.").
75 Id. at 96, 100 (rejecting the gestational surrogate's claim that her relationship with the child
is constitutionally protected, and holding that "a woman who enters into a gestational surrogacy
arrangement is not exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is agreeing to
provide a necessary and profoundly important service without (by definition) any expectation that
she will raise the resulting child as her own").
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surrogacy agreement, a Utah court invalidated a broad statutory
prohibition on all kinds of surrogacy. Like in Calvert, the court
sympathized with a couple who was "unable for medical reasons to
have children on their own," 76 and held that the statute unduly burdened
their fundamental liberty interest in conceiving and raising children
without unwarranted government interference. 77 Likewise, the New
Jersey Superior Court characterized a gestational surrogacy arrangement
as one that "permits a woman who is incapable of carrying a baby to
term to have a child who is genetically related to her," and that "gives
the wife of an infertile couple the opportunity to be biologically related
to the baby and ensures that the woman who gives birth is not
genetically linked to the child. ' 78 A California appellate court also
affirmed that gestational surrogacy is distinguishable from full
surrogacy because the full surrogate is "without doubt, the 'natural'
parent of the child, as is the father."79 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts ruled that adoption laws do not apply in cases of
gestational surrogacy because the gestational surrogate is a carrier and
not a mother.80
Medical necessity and genetic contribution of the intended mother
is also determinative in infertility medical literature. The ASRM has
recently defined gestational surrogacy as a "treatment option available
to women with certain clearly defined medical problems, usually an
absent uterus, to help them have their own genetic children. '81 The
initial indication (qualification) for gestational surrogacy is when a
woman "has normally functioning ovaries but ... lacks a uterus. ' 82 The
lack of uterus is understood as "cured" by the IVF treatment through the
76 J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270 (D. Utah 2002) (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 1296.
78 A.H.W. v. G.H.B, 772 A.2d 948, 949-50, 339 N.J. Super. 495, 497-498 (2000) (emphasis
added) (issuing an order permitting petitioner biological parents' names to be placed on the birth
certificate during the two day window between expiration of the statutory waiting period and the
deadline for filing the certificate); see also P.G.M. v. J.M.A, No. A07-452, 2007 Minn. App.
LEXIS 1189, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2007) (holding that gestational surrogacy
agreements "do not violate any articulated public policy of this state").
79 In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1222 (1994).
80 Culliton v. Beth Israel, 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137-38, 435 Mass. 285, 290-91 (2001) (entering
a judgment declaring the intended genetic parents to be the child's parents, and ordering the
hospital to identify them as the legal parents on the birth certificate); see also Arredondo v.
Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (granting an uncontested post-birth petition of
genetic parents of children born pursuant to gestational carrier arrangement, declaring genetic
mother the legal mother of donor insemination children, and ordering issuance of new birth
records so to reflect).
81 Peter Brindsen, Gestational Surrogacy, 9 HUMAN REPRODUCTION UPDATE 483, 483
(2003) (emphasis added).
82 ASRM Guide for Patients, supra note 59, at 13; see also Brindsen, supra note 81, at 489
("The indications for treatment by gestational surrogacy are limited to a small number of women,
most of whom have no uterus, suffer from recurrent abortion, or who have certain medical
conditions, which would threaten their lives if they were to become pregnant.").
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use of the "gestational carrier." The "gestational carrier" has no genetic
link to the fetus, and this makes the arrangement, according the ASRM,
less controversial than full surrogacy "both legally and
psychologically. '83
Medical necessity and genetic contribution as prerequisites for a
valid and enforceable gestational surrogacy agreement have also
appeared in recent gestational surrogacy statutes enacted in Illinois,
Florida and Texas. In the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act (2005), the
intended parents satisfy the requirements of the Act if, in addition to
receiving proper legal consultation, they meet all the following
requirements at the time that the agreement was executed:
(1) he, she, or they contribute at least one of the gametes resulting in
a pre-embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to
term; (2) he, she, or they have a medical need for the gestational
surrogacy as evidenced by a qualified physician's affidavit attached
to the gestational surrogacy contract and as required by the Illinois
Parentage Act of 1984; [and] (3) he, she, or they have completed a
mental health evaluation .... 84
The legislation explicitly leaves intact the unenforceable legal
status of full surrogacy agreements by clarifying that "except as
provided in this Act, the woman who gives birth to a child is presumed
to be the mother of that child for purposes of State law."'85
Similar conditions are found in the Florida Gestational Surrogacy
Statute which requires that:
[T]he commissioning couple shall enter into a contract with a
gestational surrogate only when, within reasonable medical certainty
as determined by a [licensed] physician[:] ... (a) the commissioning
mother cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term; (b) the
gestation will cause a risk to the physical health of the
commissioning mother; or (c) the gestation will cause a risk to the
health of the fetus. 86
The statute also requires that the gestational surrogate become pregnant
"without the use of an egg from her body, '87 and that the child be
conceived "by means of assisted reproductive technology using the eggs
or sperm of at least one of the intended parents." 88
The Texas statutory scheme, enacted in 2003, also instructs the
court to validate gestational surrogacy agreements only if it finds that
83 ASRM Guide for Patients, supra note 59, at 3 ("The gestational surrogate has no genetic
link to the fetus she is carrying. Traditional surrogacy arrangements often are perceived as
controversial with the potential to be complicated both legally and psychologically.").
84 Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2008) (emphasis added).
85 Id. at 47/15.
86 Gestational Surrogacy Contract, FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2008) (emphasis added).
87 Id. § 742.13(5).
88 Id. § 742.13(2) (emphasis added).
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"the medical evidence provided shows that the intended mother is
unable to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to the child or is
unable to carry the pregnancy to term and give birth to a child without
unreasonable risk to her physical or mental health or to the health of the
unborn child." 89  The statute also requires that "[t]he gestational
mother's eggs may not be used in the assisted reproduction
procedure, '' 90 and that the eggs must instead be retrieved from an
intended parent or a donor.91 The intended parents must also be married
to each other. 92
In comparison, the statutes in North Dakota and Nevada have
focused more on genetic contribution of the intended parents and less on
"curing" infertility. These legislatures as well have made clear that the
legal status of full surrogacy remains unchanged. For example, the
North Dakota statute, enacted in 2005, requires the genetic contribution
of both intended parents. 93  The statute distinguishes gestational
surrogacy from full surrogacy by defining a (full) "surrogate" as one
who agrees to "bear a child conceived through assisted conception for
intended parents," 94 and a "gestational carrier" as one who agrees to
"have an embryo implanted in her and bear the resulting child for
intended parents, where the embryo is conceived by using the egg and
sperm of the intended parents. '95 The statute clarifies that whereas "a
child born to a gestational carrier is a child of the intended parents for
all purposes and is not the child of the gestational carrier," 96 "any
agreement in which a woman agrees to become a [full] surrogate ... is
void. ' 97 Similarly, the Nevada surrogacy statute allows (only) married
couples to enter an agreement for a "pregnancy resulting when an egg
and sperm from the intended parents are placed in a surrogate through
the intervention of medical technology." 98
IVF baby-making markets for egg donation and gestational
surrogacy have followed. It is now commonly accepted that gestational
surrogates are and should be compensated. As of 2004, gestational
surrogate compensation was between $30,000 and $120,000. 99 The
U.S. commercial market for eggs is well developed. By 1997, seventy-
89 TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.756(b)(2) (2008) (emphasis added).
90 Id. at § 160.754(c).
91 Id.
92 Id. at §160.754(b).
93 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 (2008).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. § 14-18-08.
97 Id. § 14-18-05.
98 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (2008) (the statute also provides that "[i]t is unlawful to
pay or offer to pay money or anything of value to a surrogate except for the medical and
necessary living expenses related to the birth of the child as specified in the contract").
99 Id. at 92.
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eight percent of the 335 assisted reproduction programs reporting to the
ASRM stated that they offered egg donation services for
compensation.100 By 1999, some IVF programs offered as much as
$5,000 per retrieval,' 0' and by 2004, most large fertility centers offered
their own "in-house" egg programs with a catalog of potential donors
and prices that typically range between $3,000 and $8,000.102 Centers
recruit donors and provide their potential clients physical and social
descriptions of the egg providers. 103 Because commercial selling of
eggs remains illegal in most other industrialized countries, U.S. firms
have risen to the top of the global egg trade. 104
In sum, the medical and legal understanding of sperm donation,
egg donation and gestational surrogacy as cures for infertility can be
seen as the birth-moments of those three baby-making markets. In
contrast, the next Part will argue that full surrogacy has not been
endorsed by medical and legal authorities as cure for female infertility,
and has therefore not developed into a baby-making market.
II. THE BABY-SELLING PARADIGM
While we recognize the depth of the yearning of infertile couples to
have their own children, we find the payment of money to a
"surrogate" mother illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially
degrading to women. 105
Unlike gestational surrogacy, full surrogacy has rarely been
understood as a cure for medical infertility. It has been classified as
baby-selling. This Part discusses the critical influence of feminist-
ethical positions on the exclusion of full surrogacy from baby-making
markets.
100 Id. at 216.
101 Id. Much higher sums, $50,000 or more, have been offered in print and internet ads placed
by individuals and couple seeking eggs from women with specific physical characteristics and
intellectual abilities. Id.
102 Id. at 45.
103 Id. ("At the center for egg donation, for example, clients from around the world searched
an online database of donors, complete with name, SAT scores and glossy photos of both the
donor and her own family ... although the center's Beverly Hills location led to an apparent
cluster of blond and blue eyed eggs, it also offered harder to find types, including Jewish, red-
headed, and South Asian prospects.").
104 Id. at 46 ("At the center for egg donations, 30 percent of the business in 2003 came from
abroad, and the number was steadily rising.").
105 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 411 (1988).
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A. The Solidification of the Baby-Selling Paradigm in the Case of
Baby M
By the late 1970s, the implications of the legalization of donor
insemination for full surrogacy were profound. While in the past the
main way for surrogates to be impregnated was by sexual intercourse
with the prospective father, now sex was removed. This made full
surrogacy more attractive than in the past, enhancing both the demand
for and the supply of surrogate mothers. 106 In 1976, Noel Keane, an
attorney from Michigan was one of the first to recognize the potential of
this market.107 Keane, professed to have been moved by religion and
compassion, sided with "the people who want to create life."'0 8  He
placed an ad in a local college paper seeking the services of a surrogate.
By the early 1980s, Keane was described as "the undisputed father of
surrogate motherhood."'1 09  Due to strict Michigan laws, Keane
eventually turned to Florida, a state with fewer restrictions on surrogacy
at the time.110 Small competitors appeared in California and
Kentucky, 11 and a market for full surrogacy was on the way.
Prior to the case of Baby M (1988), lawmakers were ambivalent
about how to regulate agreements for full surrogacy. 112  Some
legislatures, such as New York, considered the legalization of full
surrogacy. 113 Some courts equated sperm donation with full surrogacy,
stressing that both sperm and full surrogacy are designed to cure
infertility. These cases sometimes used the logic and language of the
cure for infertility paradigm to explain full surrogacy. For example, one
New York court reasoned that "the problem ... caused by the wife's
infertility ... is solved by artificial insemination [and] is not
biologically different from the reverse situation where the husband is
infertile and the wife conceives by artificial insemination."'1 14
106 See, e.g., SPAR, supra note 51, at 74; Sanger, supra note 3, at 81-88.
107 For further discussion of Keane and the role of intermediaries in the market for full
surrogacy see id.
108 Id. at 83 (citing NOEL P. KEANE & DENNIN L. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 256
(1981)).
109 Id. at 83 (citing James S. Kunen, Childless Couples Seeking Surrogate Mothers Call
Michigan Lawyer Noel Keane-He Delivers, TIME, Mar 30, 1987, at 93).
110 SPAR, supra note 51, at 76.
111 Id. at 76-77.
112 For further discussion see Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of
Commodification, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1282330#.
113 See James Feron, Testimony Is Given on Surrogates Bill, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1987, at 39
(describing testimony by infertile parents and surrogates favoring new bill introduced in 1986).
114 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817 (Sur. Ct. 1986) (holding
that a full surrogacy agreement is not void but voidable); see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs.,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Ky. 1986) (equating sperm donations to full
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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
While in the early years of full surrogacy courts and legislatures
still had no clear uniform position about the legal status of full
surrogacy, commodification concerns appeared in social-legal debate on
full surrogacy. In July of 1984, a committee appointed by the British
government published a report regarding the legal, social and ethical
implications of new developments in infertility treatments. 115  The
sixteen member committee was headed by Mary Warnock, a moral
philosopher, and was composed of theologians, philosophers,
philanthropists, scientists, lawyers, social workers and doctors. The
committee condemned the practice of full surrogacy for profit,
recommending that such agreements should be made unenforceable and
that agencies that arrange such agreements should be made criminally
liable because "even in compelling medical circumstances, the danger
of exploitation of one human being for another" outweighs the interests
and potential benefits of the parties. 116
Many medical experts were also disturbed by full surrogacy. In
contrast with sperm donation for male infertility, fertility experts found
(full) surrogacy to be ethically problematic.' 17 From a technological
standpoint, the identical technology used in donor insemination was not
endorsed by fertility experts for the use of full surrogacy. 118 The
American Medical Association concluded in 1983 that surrogacy does
not represent a satisfactory alternative for prospective parents, 19 and in
surrogacy, and holding that full surrogacy agreements do not fall within statutory prohibitions
against baby-selling and holding that surrogate parenting organization's activities were not within
the statutory prohibition against purchasing a child for the purpose of adoption). Notably while
these decisions rejected the baby-selling paradigm (criminal law), they nonetheless insisted that
the surrogate is the legal mother (family law) and thus left the surrogate the option to perform or
renege as the agreements are voidable (contract law). For further discussion of choice of law in
the case of Baby M see Carol Sanger, (Baby) M is For Many Things: Why I Start with Baby M, 44
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1443, 1448-1450 (2000).
115 See, e.g., Jacqueline Priest, The Report of the Warnock Committee on Human Fertilisation
and Embryology, 48 MOD. L. REV. 73 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Embryos and Ethics: Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 17 FAM. PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 140-44 (1985) (critiquing the Warnock committee for neglecting difficult and
moral questions, such as whether work as a surrogate is inherently more exploitative than
scrubbing floors or working with toxic chemicals, and whether criminalization of surrogacy is
any more likely than the protective labor laws of the 1930's to provide real protection).
116 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, HER
MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE, at 46 (London 1984) (emphasis added). However, the
committee approved the practice of egg donation through in vitro fertilization (IVF) carried out
under the supervision of licensed medical practitioners. The committee equated this with the
legitimate practice of fertilization by sperm donation performed by a licensed physician.
117 Notably, some medical practitioners and experts did support the practice of surrogacy,
advancing cure rhetoric similar to that of the donor insemination context.
118 Bernstein, supra note 21, at 1117-18 ("The application of Al [artificial insemination]
technology to surrogacy, has, thus at large, not significantly benefited from previous acceptance
of the technology and was not assisted, as was the case with AID [artificial insemination by
donor], from mobilization by the medical profession.").
119 Id. at 1115-16 (citation omitted).
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THE CURING LAW
1986 the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Association
recommended greater scrutiny of full surrogacy. 120 The view that the
practice of full surrogacy is not a cure for infertility was made explicit
by fertility experts who emphasized that surrogacy is "neither curative
nor palliative" and does not restore function .... ,,121
The case of Baby M solidified the legal classification of full
surrogacy as commodification and baby-selling. As Elizabeth Scott has
recently argued, "Baby M, the dramatic and emotional legal battle
between a housewife who had dropped out of high-school and a couple
with graduate degrees and professional careers who sought to have a
child with her assistance, focused national attention on the issue and
framed the practice as commodification."' 22 In Baby M, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a paid full surrogacy agreement is "illegal,
perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to women."' 123 The court
clarified that a full surrogate is the "natural" and legal mother of the
child, 124 and that under the terms of such agreements, she is "forever
separated from her child." 125  The intended mother was granted no
parental rights or duties,1 26 and the full surrogacy agreement was held to
violate baby-selling and adoption statutes as well as the public policy of
New Jersey. 127
A legal trend toward restrictions on full surrogacy agreements
followed. Most legislatures at the time were unaware of the newly
developed IVF technology, and thus framed their statutory limitations
primarily as a response to full surrogacy agreements (such as the one in
Baby M). As a result some statutes ended up with narrow statutes that
restrict full surrogacy specifically (leaving gestational surrogacy
unregulated), 128 whereas others (probably unintentionally) adopted
120 Id. at 1115 (citation omitted).
121 Id. at 1116 (citation omitted).
122 Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstract id=1282330#
(arguing that the political and legal responses to the case of Baby M were a combination of moral
panic and interest group politics; and that opinion leaders, primarily religious groups and
feminists, reinforced the moral panic and formed an effective coalition that persisted for several
years).
123 In re Baby M, 109 N.J 396, 411 (1988).
124 Id. at 411 ("The contract providing for this is called a 'surrogacy contract,' the natural
mother inappropriately called the 'surrogate mother."').
125 Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
126 Id. at 413 ("Her anxiety appears to have exceeded the actual risk, which current medical
authorities assess as minimal.").
127 Id. at 411. In 1981, ruling on one of the first constitutional challenges to governmental
limitations on surrogacy arrangements, a Michigan appellate court upheld surrogacy restrictions,
because "[i]n effect, the plaintiffs' contractual agreement discloses a desire to use the adoption
code to change the legal status of the child [and] [w]e do not perceive this goal as within the
realm of fundamental interests protected by the right to privacy from reasonable governmental
regulation." Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 174 (1981).
128 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2008) (only full surrogacy agreements void and
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1910 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:5
broader restrictive language that theoretically could be applicable to
gestational surrogacy agreements as well. 129
Since Baby M, courts in states with no surrogacy statutes have
viewed full surrogacy agreements as unenforceable (void or voidable)
and conflicting with adoption or baby-selling laws. 130 Most courts have
viewed a commitment to be a full surrogate as substantially different
from a commitment to provide sperm because a surrogate supplies a
"life in being," whereas a sperm donor provides "merely a gamete."' 31
unenforceable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2008) (only full surrogacy agreements null, void
and unenforceable); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (2008) (full surrogacy contract void if
compensation is involved). But see Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (surrogate parenting contracts are voidable, rather than illegal and void).
129 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.240 (2008) (gross misdemeanor if compensation is
involved); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 165 (2008) (any agreement for payment of compensation
is void and unenforceable, but married couple with infertile wife can effectively contract for both
types of surrogacy if no payment is involved); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 722.855 (2008) (both types
of agreements are void, and are unenforceable as against public policy if involving
compensation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to 32 (2008) (limiting fees to pregnancy
related expenses, lost wages, insurance., attorney's fees and court costs, and setting infertility of
intended mother as a condition for enforceable agreement); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-123
(2008) (both types of agreement violate public policy, and are void and unenforceable regardless
of compensation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-20-1-1 to -3 (2008) (agreement void as against public
policy regardless of compensation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2008) (both types of
surrogacy contracts prohibited regardless of compensation). But see Soos v. Superior Court, 182
Ariz. 470 (Ct. App. 1994) (fundamental liberty interest affected and equal protection violated by
statute); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401(4) to 402 (2008) (both types of surrogacy are prohibited and
unenforceable regardless of compensation, with a civil penalty of up to $10,000 or imprisonment
up to a year or both).
130 See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 426 Mass. 501, 509 (1998) (holding full surrogacy agreement
unenforceable because no private agreement regarding custody or adoption can be conclusive
until a judge ruling on custody decides based on the best interest of the child); Decker v. Decker,
No. 5-01-23, 2001 WL 1167475 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2001) (holding that the fact that birth
mother may have signed a unilateral statement relinquishing custody does not constitute a
contract); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1231 (Ct. App. 1994) (declining to
enforce a full surrogacy contract because "to do so would mean we would have to ignore both the
analysis used by our Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert, and the adoption statute that requires a
formal consent to a child's adoption by his or her birth mother). But cf In re Adoption of Baby
A, 128 Or. App. 450 (Ct. App. 1994) (where evidence showed that birth-mother would have
entered contract without compensation, and did not seek to withdraw her consent to adoption,
trial court refusal to grant adoption was reversed despite the fact that surrogate was compensated
in violation of statute).
131 In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that a full
surrogacy contract was void because under the clear language of the statutes governing adoption
and the policy of the state, it provided for "the sale of the child, or, at the very least, the sale of a
mother's right to her child"); see also In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 449-450 (1998) (holding that a
sperm donor cannot be equated with a surrogate mother, even if the only difference was the
amount of time necessary to provide sperm for artificial insemination and that necessary for a
nine month pregnancy); R.R., 426 Mass. at 509 (full surrogacy "presents different considerations
from surrogate fatherhood because surrogate motherhood is never anonymous and her
commitment and contribution is unavoidably greater than that of a sperm donor").
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THE CURING LAW
B. The Role of Feminist Ethics in the Shaping of the Baby-Selling
Paradigm
An ethical feminist resistance to full surrogacy has played an
important role in the shaping of the baby-selling paradigm. By the
1980s full surrogacy was viewed by many feminists as "the most
controversial of the alternative reproductive technologies." 132  The
feminist concern with full surrogacy focused on two realms of
exploitation and commodification. First, as the practice of surrogacy
was gaining public attention, some feminists expressed the concern that
surrogacy may perpetuate male dominance over and objectification of
women. 133 This exploitation, located on class and gender lines, may
cause, as Margaret Jane Radin has emphasized, "even further
oppression of poor or ignorant women, which must be weighed against
a possible step toward their liberation through economic gain . . .134
An individual woman's choice to enter a surrogacy agreement was
characterized as "an ironic self deception," because "[s]urrogates may
feel they are fulfilling their womanhood by producing babies for
someone else, although they may actually be reinforcing oppressive
gender roles."' 135 Second, the practice of full surrogacy embodied for
some feminists the danger of a "capitalist baby industry," which, "with
all of its accompanying paraphernalia," would lead to a society in which
none of us, "even those who did not produce infants for sale, [can]
avoid subconsciously measuring the dollar value of our children" and in
which "our children [cannot] avoid being preoccupied with ... their
own dollar value."'1 36
We can now see that in the regulation of full surrogacy lawmakers
have taken up ethical feminist positions on commodification of women
and babies. By the late 1980s, ethical feminist views were powerful in
the governance of reproduction, emerging from within ethics
132 See, e.g., Patricia Donovan, New Reproductive Technologies: Some Legal Dilemmas, 18
FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 57, 59 (1986); Patricia A. Avery, Surrogate Mothers: Center of a
New Storm, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP., June 6, 1983, at 76; Otto Freidrich, A Legal, Moral, Social
Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54; Jay Matthews, Surrogate Motherhood Becoming an
American Growth Industry, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1983, at A2.
133 See, e.g., G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 272-324 (1985); Norma Juliet Wikler,
Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1043, 1046-47 (1986).
134 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1930, 1936 (1987)
("Market-inalienability is an important normative category for our society. Economic analysis
and traditional liberal pluralism have failed to recognize and correctly understand its significance
because of the market orientation of their premises.").
135 Id. at 1930.
136 Id. at 1926.
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committees, legal briefs, court decisions, fertility expert opinions, and
the media.137  And although this ethical based resistance to full
surrogacy has been frequently challenged, 138 its overall effectiveness in
the shaping of surrogacy laws is an important manifestation of what
Janet Halley has called "governance feminism"--that is, "the
incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists and
feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power."'139
In sum, since the case of Baby M, full surrogacy has been
understood by lawmakers as replacement of the intended mother rather
than a cure for infertility, and therefore as baby-selling. Full surrogacy
has become a de facto exception to the cure paradigm. At the same
time, as shown in Part I, sperm donation, egg donation and gestational
surrogacy have all been understood as cures for infertility and did not
meet the same legal, medical, and feminist resistance.
The next Part will examine some problematic effects that the cure
paradigm has had on baby-making markets.
III. Two CRITIQUES OF THE CURE PARADIGM
In this Part, I critique the cure paradigm drawing on two separate
137 It is important to clarify here that this feminist regulatory power is not necessarily (though
sometimes is) voiced by what one may identify as a feminist speaker.
138 For critique of moral objection to surrogacy from a feminist perspective see Marjorie
Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323 (1990) (arguing that the principle of private
intention must be given substantial deference and legal force, and that determining legal
parenthood on the basis on intentional agreements has the potential to create more gender neutral
avenues to parenthood). For a critique of moral objection to surrogacy from economic
perspective see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 247
(1999) (arguing that "given the benefits of the contracts to the signatories, the pragmatist judge
would probably enforce such contracts regardless of what moral philosophers have to say about
the issue"); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA.
L. REV. 2305, 2330-34 (1995) (concluding that the analogy to baby-selling "only strengthens the
conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal"); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) (urging the
enforcement of baby-selling agreements); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of
Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (1989)
(arguing in favor of surrogacy contract enforcement). For critique of moral objection to
surrogacy from rights perspective see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM
AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 99 (1994); John Robertson, Assisted Reproductive
Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J 911, 932 (1996) (concluding that "although ART's
are unlikely to affect or change prevailing notions of family, they can nevertheless be seen as part
of a larger set of developments affecting the autonomy of individuals to shape families and
childrearing units to their needs").
139 Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to
Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance
Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 340 (2006) (noting that "[governance feminism] takes
many forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others; some are not
players at all").
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THE CURING LAW
theoretical perspectives. First, from a feminist-queer perspective, I
argue that the cure paradigm reflects and naturalizes certain
assumptions about sex, gender and reproduction. Second, from an
economic perspective, I argue that the cure paradigm has produced
baby-making markets that are accessible only to higher income
individuals and couples.
A. The Gendered Cure Paradigm
The focus on curing medical infertility has masked other societal
values and assumptions. Specifically, cultural beliefs regarding (1)
paternal and maternal roles in reproduction; and (2) the significance of
biological sex in reproduction, have influenced the shaping of legal
attitudes toward reproductive technologies.
1. Paternal and Maternal Gender Roles
Two cultural beliefs have so far been overlooked in the analysis of
baby-making markets. First, a gendered assumption about men played
an important role in the legalization of donor insemination. As
discussed in Part I, around the mid-twentieth century lawmakers
gradually became concerned with paternal obligations of child support.
This is reflected in the Gursky and Sorensen decisions. 140 In the late
1960s, a growing judicial anxiety about paternal financial responsibility
was an important consideration in the transition of lawmakers' attitudes
toward donor insemination. Thus the Gursky court used the doctrines of
implied contract and equitable estoppel to hold the husband liable for
support. 41 And the Sorensen court dismissed the adultery framework
altogether, holding that a husband is the lawful father of a child born to
his wife through the use of donor insemination, and that "his conduct
carries with it an obligation of support within the meaning of section
270 of the Penal Code." 142 So in the overall transition of legal and
social attitudes toward approval of donor insemination, the "objective"
paradigm of cure was not doing all the work-there was also the
cultural conviction that male adults should be socially accountable for
children for whose birth they were responsible. In that sense, the visible
work of the cure paradigm was accompanied by the disguised work of
other values that are not scientific or medical.
Second, a gendered assumption about women may also explain the
140 See supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
142 People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 283-84 (1968).
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distinction between full surrogacy and the IVF procedures of egg
donation and gestational surrogacy. The assumption is that unlike men,
women should physically participate in the process of reproduction. In
the second phase of the cure paradigm (the legalization of egg donation
and gestational surrogacy), regulatory trends have encouraged (and
sometimes required) intended mothers to provide their own uterus or
eggs. A woman who either hires a gestational surrogate or purchases an
egg from another is seen in a growing number of jurisdictions as acting
to cure her own infertility. She is a legal mother.
The notion that mothers should physically participate in the
reproductive process may explain the current paradoxical distinction
between full and gestational surrogacy traced in Parts I and II. Whereas
in gestational surrogacy the intended mother usually provides her own
eggs, and thus participates in the physical process of reproduction, in
full surrogacy the intended mother provides neither eggs nor gestation,
and the full surrogate provides both. And whereas arguably the
rationale of the distinction is that full surrogacy is more exploitative
than gestational surrogacy, this does not seem accurate today.
Gestational "carriers" are indeed mostly lower income black women,
and "[g]estational surrogacy invites the singling out of black women for
exploitation not only because a disproportionate number of black
women are poor and might possibly turn to leasing their wombs as a
means of income, but also because it is incorrectly assumed that black
women's skin color can be read as a visual sign of their lack of genetic
relation to the children they would bear for the white couples who seek
to hire them."'143
And because gestational surrogacy can be as exploitative as full
surrogacy, it seems that among other factors, the conscious or
unconscious preference that women physically participate in
reproduction may have had an influence on the overall favoring of
gestational surrogacy over full surrogacy by medical and legal
authorities. When such participation is evident (by providing egg or
gestation), the cure paradigm has emerged to legitimize the curing
technology, but where such participation is not evident (such as in full
surrogacy), the cure paradigm has not appeared. This demonstrates that
the cure paradigm is not purely objective, and that the current
preference of gestational surrogacy over full surrogacy is yet another
instance in which scientific and medical truths incorporate less visible
cultural norms.
Interestingly, this cultural premise that women should physically
bear children and men should support them can be traced to the biblical
account of the mythic expulsion of the first two humans from the
143 Deborah R. Grayson, Mediating Intimacy: Black Surrogate Mothers and the Law, 24
CRITICAL INQUIRY 525, 540 (1998).
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Garden of Eden. After condemning the serpent and its seed to eternal
conflict with the woman and her seed, God says to the woman, "I will
greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt
bring forth children." 144 And to Adam, God says, "[I]n the sweat of thy
face shalt thou eat bread."' 145 The woman now receives the name Eve
(Chava), because she is the "mother of all living" [chai].146 Eve is
named in the biblical text only after she is condemned to sorrowful
child bearing.
So while curing medical infertility has been the manifested goal of
baby-making markets, cultural assumptions about men as breadwinners
and women as the primary physical participants in "bringing forth
children" have been pending in the background of twentieth century
baby-making markets. Today the sperm of a man can be replaced by
another's, so long as the intended father provides financially for the
child; whereas the law does not recognize the full replacement of a
woman's reproductive role by another.
2. Transgender Fathers
Another often overlooked cultural assumption disguised by the
cure paradigm is that fathers are always male-born and mothers are
always female-born. This bias is found in cases involving the parental
status of female to male (FTM) transgender men whose female spouse
was impregnated through donor insemination. The cure logic, as we
saw in Sorensen, was historically set up to "cure" infertile male-born
husbands in the context of marriage. 147 It was later extended to male
co-habitants and to same sex partners, who have been obliged to pay
child support 148 and have been granted parental rights. 149 Recently,
144 Genesis 3:16 (King James).
145 Genesis 3:19 (King James).
146 Genesis 3:20 (King James).
147 Today some states still specifically ban the use of artificial insemination by all but married
couples. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 553 (1998). Other states adopted the 1973 UPA
without later revision, thus limiting statutory coverage to married couples while not specifically
prohibiting donor insemination to others. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); MINN. STAT.
§ 257.56 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (2001);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061(2) (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(3) (West 2000); Id. § 32.1-
257(D). Some states have enacted provisions that refer only to married couples. ALA. CODE §
26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2000); FLA. STAT. § 742.11(1) (2001); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-7-21 (1999); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (LexisNexis 2001); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2824(6) (West
1997); MINN. STAT. § 257.56; MO. REV. STAT. § 210.824; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106
(2001); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551-553 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
3-306 (1996).
148 See, e.g., In re Parentage of A.B., 837 N.E,2d 965 (Ind. 2005) (reversing the trial court's
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some courts have taken the additional step of applying a gender neutral
interpretation of donor insemination statutes to oblige a same-sex
partner to pay child support, 150 and to recognize legal parenthood of
same-sex partners. 151
In the few cases addressing a sperm donation where the sperm
"lacking" party was a transgender FTM man, courts have recognized
paternity only as a punitive matter, but not as a matter of parental rights
(to custody or visitation). While a FTM transgender man has been
obliged to pay child support for a child conceived through donor
insemination, 152 similarly situated others were denied parental rights. 15 3
dismissal of the partner's complaint and remanding the case to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the children's best interest in these circumstances); Chambers v.
Chambers, No. CN99-09493, 2005 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS I (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 12, 2005)
(construing statutory law in light of children's best interests, and clarifying that Delaware
recognized de facto parenthood for certain purposes where a five-factor test was satisfied); L.S.K.
v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 2002) (holding that in the absence of legislative action,
court was obliged to apply equitable rules in the children's best interest and since the partner had
claimed the rights of a parent, she was equitably estopped from denying responsibilities of
support incurred under 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321).
149 See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash. 2d 679 (2005) (although former partner was
not a biological or adoptive parent, she had standing under Washington law to petition the courts
for a determination of co-parentage with regard to the child, based on common law theories of
parenthood, but the former partner did not have standing to assert rights to visitation with the
child because she is not a parent under the statute); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis. 2d 649,
659-63 (1995) (under Wisconsin law, the biological mother's former female partner lacked
standing to petition for custody or visitation, but the legislature did not intend to preempt the
equitable power of the court so as to preclude a remedy outside of the statutory scheme); E.N.O.
v. L.L.M., 429 Mass. 824, 828-30 (1999) (equity jurisdiction governed resolution of the issue
despite lack of statutory authority, and the best interests of the child require that the child's de-
facto parent be allowed visitation with the child); Clifford K. v. Paul S., 217 W. Va. 625 (2005)
(same sex parent had standing to pursue custody of the child under the "unusual or extraordinary"
case section of W. VA. CODE § 48-9-103(b), because the parent raised the child from birth and
had a strong maternal bond with him).
150 Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 4th 108 (2005) (applying a gender neutral reading of
California statutory law to conclude that a child can have "two parents both of whom are
women," and that the former same-sex partner who agreed to raise children with the birth-mother,
supported the birth-mother's artificial insemination using an anonymous sperm donor, received
the children into her home and held them out as her own, was a parent and had an obligation to
support the children).
151 In re Parentage of Robinson, 383 N.J. Super 165 (2005) (granting a same sex couple's
request to declare the non-biologically related partner the second parent of a child conceived
through artificial insemination, and concluding that it could not discern any state interest that
would preclude the partner from the protection of the statute); Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 140
Cal. App. 4th 301 (2006) (reversing a trial court finding that former same-sex partner lacked
standing to bring action under the UPA); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 37 Cal. 4th 156 (2005) (ruling
that a biological mother is estopped from challenging the validity of a stipulated judgment
recognizing her same sex partner's parenthood because under the California family Code a child
can have two mothers and permitting a mother to attack the judgment's validity would have been
unfair to the child and the second mother).
152 In re Karin T., 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (obliging transgender father to support
children born of donor insemination during his marriage).
153 In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 I1. App. 3d 942 (2005) (ruling that because same-sex
marriages are invalid under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/201 (2002), and the impediment of
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Courts have narrowly interpreted statutes and contracts to apply to
male-born husbands and co-habitants but not to female born transgender
fathers. For example, in Marriage of Simmons, where a transgender
man married a woman, and a child was conceived through donor
insemination, 154 an Illinois appellate court denied all of the father's
claims for legal rights with the child because "[a]ll the physicians
testified that there were other surgeries which had to be done on
petitioner before he could be considered completely sexually
reassigned."'' 55 The transgender man was not yet fully "cured" from his
Gender Identity Disorder (GID). 156  The court also dismissed the
plaintiffs contract based argument, holding that the agreement that he
had signed as a "husband" was invalid.1 57
The legal exclusions of FTM fathers from donor insemination
statutes and agreements illustrate that the seemingly objective cure
paradigm is not value neutral. It has incorporated the cultural norm that
only male-born individuals are potential fathers to children born of
donor insemination. Other men have to provide medical-scientific
being female was never removed, the father could not claim status as a husband, and that this
inability to prove status as either a "man" or a "husband" likewise deprived him of standing under
either the Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/1 to 40/3 (2002), or the
Parentage Act of 1984, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1 to 45/28 (2002)).
154 Id. (plaintiff was diagnosed as a transsexual man in his late teens and began taking
testosterone when he was 21 years old).
155 Id. at 948 (female to male transition surgeries include "vaginectomy, reduction
mammoplasty, metoidoiplasti, scrotoplasty, urethroplasty, and phalloplasty" and because he "still
possesses all of his female genitalia," plaintiff is legally female). Notably, the court applied here
a very narrow definition of sex, ignoring other sex determining factors such as chosen sex,
hormonal sex, overall outer appearance, internal organs, etc.
156 The diagnostic criteria for Gender Identity Disorder (GID), according to TASK FORCE ON
DSM-IV, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 537-38 (4th ed. 1994) is as following:
A. A strong and persistent cross gender identification (not merely a desire for any
perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex). B. Persistent discomfort with his
or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. C. The
disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition. D. The disturbance
causes clinically significant distress of impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning.
For further analysis of the problematic role of Gender Identity Disorder in the regulation of
transgender and Intersex individuals see Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A
Struggle for Intersex and Transsex Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51 (2006); Noa Ben-
Asher, Paradoxes of Health and Equality: When a Boy Becomes a Girl, 16 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 275 (2004).
157 The child's claim as a third-party beneficiary to the contract was also rejected by the court,
based on the invalidity of the contract, In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 Il1. App. 3d 942, 955
(2005). In addition, petitioner's reliance on the Illinois Parentage Act which creates a
presumption of parenthood under which a child born from donor insemination to two married
parents retains his right with both even if the marriage is subsequently held invalid also failed.
Id. at 952 ("That section, which confers a presumption of a 'man' to be the natural father of a
child even after a marriage has been declared invalid, is based on the premise that the parties who
are involved are a man and a woman. As we have previously determined, petitioner is not a man
within the meaning of the statute, and that, therefore, the statute does not apply.").
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proof that their transition from female to male has satisfied medical
guidelines, and that they properly fit within the medically framed
male/female, father/mother binaries.
B. The Inaccessibility of Baby-Making Markets
We should also consider how legal rules regarding reproductive
technologies affect the bargaining process that occurs outside the
courtroom.15 8 The cure paradigm as applied by courts and by legislators
has created markets in which, due to steep prices, lower income
individuals and couples are often unable to participate.
1. The Absent Market for Full Surrogacy
The legal classification of full surrogacy as baby-selling and
maternal replacement has had crippling effects on the formation of a
market for full surrogacy. 59 And while the market for full surrogacy
has effectively diminished, egg donations and gestational surrogacy,
which have been legalized as legitimate curing treatments for infertility,
are very costly. 160 The average cost for a cycle of IVF in the US was
$12,400 in 2003.161 Eggs cost more than sperm ($4,500 versus $300 on
average), and as mentioned above, gestational surrogates are
compensated between $30,000 and $120,000.162 Consequently, many
potential buyers in the baby-making markets cannot afford to enter
those markets. The demand is here, and the supply is as well, but "the
price of this supply is still too high for many potential buyers, leaving
supply and demand to meet at a point well below their full potential. ' 163
The price constraint can theoretically be solved by folding fertility
treatment into the national healthcare system, 164 or by mandating
158 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) ("The preferences of the parties, the entitlements
created by law, transaction costs, attitudes toward risk, and strategic behavior substantially affect
the negotiated outcomes.").
159 SPAR, supra note 51, at 78 (The full surrogacy market in the 1980s remained relatively
small, with only about thirty commercial surrogacy agencies by 1988, making about one hundred
matches a year.).
160 Beyond the high cost of eggs, there may be medical risks to egg donors that have recently
begun to emerge. For example, a link has been suggested between breast cancer and an elevated
level of hormones induced in an in vitro cycle.
161 Id. at 29.
162 Id. at 92. According to the ASRM, however, the average is around $20,000. Press
Release, Am. Soc'y Reprod. Med., Highlights from the 62nd Annual Meeting (Oct. 24, 2006).
163 SPAR, supra note 51, at 30.
164 Such is the case in Denmark and Israel. Id.
1918 [Vol. 30:5
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insurance coverage. 65 But diverting the costs of infertility treatments to
the state or insurance policies will not tackle the actual source of this
market failure, which is that the expensive IVF technologies of egg
donation and gestational surrogacy have been legalized and
commodified whereas the much cheaper technology of full surrogacy
has not.
2. The Impact on Lower Income Households
Thus a direct consequence of the cure paradigm is that the price of
participation in baby-making markets is excessively high. Gestational
Surrogacy involves the costly high-tech IVF technology, while full
surrogacy is a low-tech (or no-tech) arrangement. Since the early
1990s, couples and individuals have been advised to pursue gestational
surrogacy in order to avoid the legal complexities of full surrogacy.166
Current medical guidelines and fertility expert literature direct couples
and individuals to the legally safe procedures of gestational surrogacy
and egg donation. 167 Those medical procedures involving IVF (egg
donations and gestational surrogacy) are significantly more expensive
than the fairly simple procedure of sperm fertilization involved in full
surrogacy. As noted in Marriage of Moschetta by the California Court
of Appeals:
Infertile couples who can afford the high-tech solution of in vitro
fertilization and embryo implantation in another woman's womb can
be reasonably assured of being judged as the legal parents of the
child, even if the surrogate reneges on her agreement. Couples who
cannot afford in-vitro fertilization and embryo implantation, or who
resort to traditional surrogacy because the female does not have eggs
suitable for in vitro fertilization, have no assurance their intentions
will be honored in a court of law.' 68
165 As in the case of fourteen U.S. states. See id.
166 Focusing on the role of the "middle man" in bargains for surrogacy, Carol Sanger has
recently observed that as a consequence of the negative treatment of monetary compensation in
cases of full surrogacy, brokers (middle men) had to go elsewhere in order to profit from such
bargains, and that is what they did. Brokers transitioned to jurisdictions that permitted surrogacy,
or to those in legal limbo. Thus, "couples can now choose from an array of surrogacy options.
They can stay close to home if the local market satisfies, or they can forum shop in the global
market of reproductive tourism." Sanger, supra note 3, at 95-96.
167 ASRM Guide for Patients, supra note 59, at 3 ("'Third Party Reproduction' also includes
traditional surrogacy and gestational carrier arrangements .... The gestational surrogate has no
genetic link to the fetus she is carrying. Traditional surrogacy arrangements often are perceived
as controversial with the potential to be complicated both legally and psychologically. Despite
the requirement for in vitro fertilization (IVF) to create embryos, the utilization of a gestational
surrogate, legally, is a lower risk procedure and is the more common approach conducted in the
United States.").
168 In re Marriage ofMoschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1235 (1994).
2009] 1919
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The Moschetta court criticized the impact of the full-gestational
surrogacy on "[heterosexual] couples who cannot afford in-vitro
fertilization and embryo implantation, or who resort to traditional
surrogacy because the female does not have eggs suitable for in vitro
fertilization."'' 69 These couples bargain in the shadow of the cure
paradigm for reproductive technologies with no legal certainty. "For
them and the child," says the court, "biology is destiny."' 7 0
3. The Impact on Potential Gay Fathers
Current baby-making market conditions have also had a direct
impact on the bargaining conditions for men looking to create
motherless families. Review of current legal disputes reveals that the
cure logic and its manifestation, the gestational/full surrogacy
distinction, create complicated and costly bargaining conditions for
males seeking to create motherless families. The current legal situation
of single and gay men seeking to create families through the baby-
making markets exemplifies how complicated bargaining in the shadow
of the cure paradigm has become.
The complexity of these bargains involves two interrelated price
increasing parameters: (1) the legalized separation of maternal labor
into gestation and genetics through the legalization of IVF and (2)
forum shopping. First, given the status of full surrogacy, men cannot
hire full surrogates to bear their children. As shown above, the current
state of the law, based on the cure paradigm, requires the separate and
much more costly purchase of eggs and gestation from two different
sources so that no potential woman will have a legal claim over the
child. Second, the costs of these transactions increase dramatically
because they often involve forum shopping for jurisdictions with clear
statutory guidelines on egg donations and gestational surrogacy. As
Carol Sanger has observed, "couples can now choose from an array of
surrogacy options. They can stay close to home if the local market
satisfies, or they can forum shop in the global market of reproductive
tourism."171
An example of such forum shopping took place in P.G.M. v.
J.M.A, where the Minnesota Supreme Court enforced a gestational
agreement in a paternity dispute between a gay male from New York
and a gestational surrogate from Minnesota. The child was conceived
using the plaintiffs sperm and a donor egg, and the parties agreed to be
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Sanger, supra note 3, at 96.
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governed by Illinois law. 172 Ruling in favor of the intended father, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed that the agreement was correctly
enforced by the lower court because gestational surrogacy agreements
"do not violate any articulated public policy of this state,"'173 and
because under Illinois law, "there is clear-and-convincing evidence
rebutting the presumption that [the gestational surrogate] is the child's
mother."'174 Similarly, in JF. v. D.B., a man entered separate
transactions with women from two different states for eggs and
gestation. In a paternity dispute between the gestational surrogate and
the intended father, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "no public
policy is violated when a gestational-surrogacy contract is entered into,
even when one of the provisions requires the gestational surrogate not to
assert parental rights regarding children she bears that are of another
woman's artificially inseminated egg."' 175 Likewise, in Roberto, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted a joint petition of an intended
genetic father and a gestational carrier asking to issue birth certificates
that did not list the gestational carrier as mother of the born twins. 176
Although in all three cases contracts were enforced in favor of
males seeking to create motherless families, the dissenting opinions in
two of these cases reveal judicial anxiety about the formation of
motherless families through the use of reproductive technologies. In
J.F. v. D.B., the dissent stressed that an agreement where a gay man
pays for gestational surrogacy and egg donations violates the public
policy of Ohio because "it would be necessary to legally declare that the
children do not have a mother. Such a position is untenable."'1 77 This
contract, according to the dissent, "is no less than a contract for the
creation of a child [and] this court should not be the unwitting
instrument to opening the door of this state to such unregulated
commercial enterprise."' 78  Likewise, the dissent in Roberto
characterized the decision not to list the gestational carrier as a mother
on the child's birth-certificate as "in essence, stating that it is good
public policy for the people of this State to permit the manufacturing of
children who have no mothers-even at the moment of birth." Thus,
172 P.G.M. v. J.M.A, No. A07-452, 2007 Minn. App. LEXIS 1189, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 2007).
173 Id. at* 18.
174 Id. at *21.
175 J.F. v. D.B, 116 Ohio St. 3d 363, 364 (2007).
176 In re Roberto, 399 Md. 267, 292-93 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[The gestational surrogate] desires
to relinquish parental rights, not assert them. There simply is no contest over parental rights.
There is no issue of unfitness on the part of the father . . . . Accordingly the implication by the
trial court that the BIC [Best Interest of the Child] standard should be used in the case sub judice
is inappropriate ... ").
177 JF., 116 Ohio St. 3d at 367.
178 Id. at 368.
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"there is to be no mother-just a Petri dish." 179
In sum, far from serving as a friendly facilitator for the "formation
of families on the basis of intent and function rather than biology and
heterosexuality," 180 current baby-making markets, shaped by the cure
paradigm, have caused single men and same-sex male couples to enter
costly and complex agreements in order to create families of choice.
C. Some Normative Implications
While a full articulation of an alternative paradigm is beyond the
scope of this Article, lawmakers can begin to resist the cure paradigm
by doing away with the full/gestational surrogacy distinction. The
full/gestational surrogacy distinction should be eliminated for two
reasons: (1) it is based on contested values, and (2) it has created serious
market failures.
First, one of the driving forces behind the full/gestational
surrogacy distinction is the idea that gestational surrogacy is a form of
medical cure whereas full surrogacy is "baby-selling." But the Article
has argued that this legal classification of gestational surrogacy as
medical cure is based on two related problematic assumptions. The first
assumption, discussed in Part I.B., is about ownership of genetic
material. Lawmakers typically view gestational surrogacy as an
arrangement where a couple gives their child to a surrogate for
gestation, whereas lawmakers view full surrogacy as an agreement
where a surrogate gives her child to the couple. Accordingly, the
former is seen as curing treatment and the latter as baby-selling. But
medical cure of infertility should not depend on genetic ownership. If
the logic of property law is running the full/gestational surrogacy
distinction, lawmakers should be clear about it. Language and logic of
a cure for infertility should not disguise premises about ownership of
genetic material.
The second assumption underlying the gestational/full surrogacy
distinction, discussed in Part III.A., is that women should physically
participate in the process of reproduction. A snapshot of baby-making
markets today reveals that lawmakers view women as "cured" from
infertility when they enter arrangements in which they provide either
their eggs or their uterus in the child bearing process. In that sense, the
paradigm of cure is gendered and should be contested, and the
gestational/full surrogacy distinction that depends on it can no longer
stand.
179 In re Roberto, 399 Md. at 301.
180 Ertman, supra note 50, at 4.
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The cure paradigm has also created serious market failures. As I
argued in Part III.B., in the absence of the option to turn to full
surrogacy, lower-income individuals and couples are de facto excluded
from participation in baby-making markets, and gay males are likewise
routed to the costly IVF procedures and costly forum shopping. A shift
of paradigm should involve the legal recognition of full surrogacy.
Opening up the market for full surrogacy seems promising for both ends
of the baby-making markets. For parties wishing to create families, it
would make baby-making markets accessible to more participants by
dramatically reducing the costs of surrogacy. Full surrogacy is a low-
cost, low-tech procedure that involves the simple injection of sperm into
the uterus of the potential surrogate, while IVF is fancy, costly, and
medically intrusive. The legal recognition of full surrogacy would
enable single males and gay and heterosexual couples to contract with
one surrogate (rather than an egg donor and a gestational surrogate) in
their home jurisdiction, thus reducing the costs of creating families of
choice. For potential surrogates, the legitimization of full surrogacy
should result in higher compensation because the high costs of IVF will
become optional rather than mandatory, and medical experts and
technologies as costly intermediaries would potentially be removed
from baby-making agreements, resulting in increased gains for the
surrogate herself.
CONCLUSION
To believe in progress is not to believe that progress has already
taken place. That would be no belief -Walter Benjamin' 8i
A medicalized notion of cure for infertility has been an important
factor in the selective legal recognition of reproductive technologies.
Reproductive technologies that lawmakers and medical experts have
classified as medical cures for infertility have been recognized by
lawmakers and commodified, while others have not. This selective
legal validation is an instance of a troubling broader phenomenon in
which lawmakers, medical experts, psychiatrists, social workers, and
others collaborate to diagnose, cure, and manage populations. When
law takes the form of a "curing law," individuals are not merely
oppressed by it, but they also (and perhaps more importantly,) come to
understand themselves in light of its medicalized categories. The
181 Walter Benjamin, Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death, in
ILLUMINATIONS: ESSAYS AND REFLECTION 111, 130 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans.,
Schocken Books 1968).
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"curing law" informs self-understanding and intelligibility. Thus it is
not surprising that women and men who cannot "naturally" have
children often view themselves as needing a medical cure.
Furthermore, because curing infertility is generally understood as a
positive social goal, the underlying assumptions of this goal are often
overlooked. There is a bind here. While lawmakers are truly concerned
with the health and welfare of the population, they often end up
reinforcing moral and cultural norms. Thus it is often difficult to
criticize liberty restricting norms when those are backed up by medical-
science and its ever growing body of experts. But we must. Moving
conceptually away from "curing laws" toward notions of "liberating
laws" may provide individuals with a broader range of views on
"natural" and "assisted" reproduction and on what "health" can mean.
Access to reproductive technologies has so far depended on legal
and medical understandings of cure for infertility. It should not be. To
believe in the progress of reproductive technologies is not to believe
that it has already taken place.
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